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Stopping Short of Justice: Hamilton and Notice
Requirements for the Redemption Period of Tax Sales

I. INTRODUCTION
An elderly man loses his entire home. It has been in his family
for generations and is worth more than $100,000. The property is
sold in a tax sale because the mortgage company inadvertently failed
to pay less than thirty dollars in property taxes. While such a
scenario naturally stirs the emotions, tax sales by state entities for
often highly insignificant sums of money are not uncommon in the
United States. In Hamilton v. Royal International Petroleum
Corp., Ithe Louisiana Supreme Court had to determine whether the
procedures that deprived Mr. Hamilton of his family home were
legally sound under both due process and state statutory constraints.
The court determined that notice of the redemption period is not
required by the Due Process Clause, and the state statutory provision
providing for notice of redemption does not include the remedy of
nullification if the notice requirement is not satisfied.
Part II of this article discusses the background of the Hamilton v.
Royal InternationalPetroleum Corp. opinion. Part III follows with
a description of the Louisiana Supreme Court's reasoning, which is
divided into separate evaluations for due process and the judicial
interpretation of the statutory requirement for notice of the
redemption period. Part IV expands upon the due process issue by
providing a historical analysis of due process as applied to tax sales
and evaluating due process specifically as applied to the facts in
Hamilton.
Part V analyzes the court's interpretation of the statutory notice
requirement for the redemption period as a state law entitlement.
Part V begins with an historical analysis of the role of the judiciary
in a civil law system, followed by a critique of the traditional view
of the judiciary. The article proceeds to evaluate the court's analysis
regarding its inability to impose a penalty where the statute does not
expressly provide one, followed by an examination ofjudicial use of
equity to fill gaps in legislation and prevent injustice.
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 934 So. 2d 25 (La. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 937 (2007).
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After a full evaluation of the court's reasoning to support its
decision, this article demonstrates that the due process
determination was faulty, and the court's conclusion with respect
to the imposition of penalties was certainly flawed. Contrary to the
court's suggestion that it was unable to impose a penalty for the tax
collector's failure to provide statutorily required notice during the
redemption period, the court could have imposed a penalty without
violating civil law traditions.
II. BACKGROUND
Michael D. Hamilton of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, lived in a
home that he inherited from his father. 2 The mortgage company
failed to pay $27.09 in property taxes for 1994, and in April 1995,
notice of the delinquency was sent to him by certified mail.3 Mr.
Hamilton signed the return receipt, which indicated that he
received the notice.4 The notice advised Mr. Hamilton that he
owed $27.09 to the city of Baton Rouge for 1994 property taxes,
and if the delinquency was not rectified within twenty days from
the date of the notice, property sufficient to satisfy the delinquency
would be seized and sold at a tax sale. 5 The tax deficiency
remained unpaid and the property was sold on June 12, 1995, to
Royal International Petroleum Corp. (hereinafter RIPCO) for
$71.68.6 The tax deed in RIPCO's name was recorded on June 30,
1995.7
2. Mr. Hamilton's current equity in the home was approximately $70,000.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Hamilton, 434 So. 2d 25 (No. 2005-C-846)
[hereinafter Petition].

3. Hamilton, 934 So. 2d at 27.
4. Id.
5. Petition, supra note 2, at 4-5. The notice sent to Mr. Hamilton's home
stated that property sufficient to satisfy the delinquency would be seized and
sold. However, article VII, section 25 of the Louisiana Constitution provides
that the property on which taxes are due shall be sold. Id. The Louisiana
Supreme Court did not discuss this discrepancy, claiming there was no dispute
that the pre-sale delinquency notice satisfied due process requirements.
Hamilton, 934 So. 2d at 32.
6. Hamilton, 934 So. 2d at 27. The price of $71.68 consisted of $27.09 in
unpaid taxes, interest of $1.59, and costs of $43.00. Id.

7. Id. The tax deed obtained by RIPCO was pursuant to Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 47:2183, which states that the property is redeemable at any
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Louisiana Constitution article VII, section 25(B)(1) provides
for a three-year redemption period during which Mr. Hamilton
could have redeemed the property. 8 During Mr. Hamilton's threeyear redemption period, the Louisiana Legislature amended
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:2180, which covers
additional procedural requirements such as requirements for notice
for the tax sale and redemption period process. 9 Prior to the
amendment, the tax collector was not statutorily required to send
notice to the taxpayer during the redemption period.' 0 Act 984,
enacted during the 1997 legislative session with an effective date
of August 15, 1997, imposed additional notice requirements.'1 The
pertinent section of the amendment created a statutory requirement
for notice during the redemption period:
On the second day of January of each year, or as soon
thereafter as possible, in each year following the year in
which the original notice of delinquency is made pursuant
to Subparagraph (a) herein, the tax collector shall address
to each taxpayer who has not paid all the taxes which have
been assessed to him on immovable property a written
notice in the manner provided herein. The notice shall
specify the property upon which the taxes are delinquent,
the amount of taxes due, and the manner in which the
property may be redeemed. The notice shall be made each
year until the property is no longer redeemable as provided
in Article VII, Section 25(B) of the Constitution of

time during the three-year redemption period. The tax deed therefore transferred
a limited property interest to RIPCO while recognizing Mr. Hamilton's
continued ability to redeem the property by paying the deficient taxes and
penalties.
8. Louisiana Constitution article VII, section 25(B)(1) states: "The
property sold shall be redeemable for three years after the date of the recordation
of the tax sale, by paying the price given, including costs, five percent penalty
thereon, and interest at the rate of one percent per month until redemption."
9. 1997 La. Acts No. 984.
10. Hamilton, 934So.2dat27-28.
11. Id. at29.
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shall be
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The cost of mailing the notice
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redemption.
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cost
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Mr. Hamilton's redemption period was to terminate on June
30, 1998. Although the amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 47:2180 did not apply retroactively to the two prior years
of Mr. Hamilton's redemption period, the statute as amended did
apply to the third year. Despite the statutory requirement, the tax
collector failed to provide Mr. Hamilton with notice in the third
year, and the redemption period expired on June 30, 1998.13
The tax title obtained by RIPCO at the tax sale is not
considered merchantable because of defenses that the tax debtor
can raise. 14 The tax title can be quieted and thereby made
merchantable by prescription of five years as granted by article
VII, section 25 of the Louisiana Constitution. The tax title can also
be quieted by bringing an action to confirm the tax title against the
former owner or his successors as outlined in Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 47:2228.15
Mr. Hamilton filed suit to challenge the validity of the tax sale
based on the failure of the tax collector to provide notice of the
redemption period. 16 The Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of East Baton Rouge rendered judgment in favor of RIPCO
and the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed. 17 The
12. LA.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 47:2180A(1)(b) (1997).

13. Hamilton v. Royal Int'l Petroleum Corp., 906 So. 2d 627, 632-33 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 2005), aff'd, 934 So. 2d 25 (La. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 937
(2007).
14. 2 Peter S. Title, Suit to Quiet Tax Sales, in LOUIsIANA REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS § 17:14 (2d ed. 2005).
15. Id. The action to quiet the title can be brought at any point after the
three-year redemption period has passed. Id. Six months after service of the
suit is filed, if no action has been brought to annul the tax sale, judgment will be
rendered quieting and confirming the tax sale, thus making the title
merchantable. Id. If the tax purchaser chooses the option of letting the five-year
prescriptive period run, the purchaser must file suit to confirm the tax title and
allow ten days to elapse for the original owner to file an action to annul the tax
sale. Id. The prescriptive period of five years is interrupted by the original
owner's continued possession of the property, so prescription does not begin to
run until the original owner is evicted.
16. Hamilton, 906 So. 2d at 630.
17. Id. at 634-35.
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Louisiana Supreme Court held that the failure of the tax collector
to provide notice during the post sale redemption period did not
violate due process, so the tax sale could not be annulled on
constitutional grounds.' 8 Furthermore, the court determined that
since the legislature did not provide a penalty for the tax
collector's statutory failure to provide redemption period notice,
the judicial system could not impose a penalty in place of the
legislature. 19
III.

THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT'S REASONING

A. Due Process

The Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged that notice of
delinquency prior to the tax sale is required by due process and
failure to provide such notice would have required the tax sale to
be annulled. 20 However, the court recognized that the due process
requirement of notice prior to the tax sale did not necessarily
extend to post-sale notice of redemption.2 1 In the court's analysis
of the due process claim for notice during the redemption period,
Justice Knoll emphasized the importance of notice and an
opportunity
to be heard prior to the deprivation of a property
22
interest.
The court concluded that notice and opportunity to be heard
were provided to Mr. Hamilton prior to the tax sale, and Mr.
23
Hamilton was properly divested of his property at the tax sale.
18. Hamilton v. Royal Int'l Petroleum Corp., 934 So. 2d 25, 33 (La. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 937 (2007).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 30 (citing Giordano v. MacDonald, 729 So. 2d 760, 762 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1999)). See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983)
(holding that failure to provide the mortgagee with notice prior to a tax sale was
a violation of due process and requiring the tax sale to be annulled).
21. Hamilton, 934 So. 2d at 31.
22. Id. at 32.
23. Id. The court concluded that Mr. Hamilton was divested of his property
at the tax sale by stating: "The post tax sale notice mandated by [Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 47:2180A(1)(b)] does not concern an opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner; that time was prior to
the tax sale, before he was divested of his property." Id. The court made an
additional statement to support its conclusion that Mr. Hamilton was divested of
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Determining that due process does not require post-sale notice of
the redemption period, the court concluded that the sale could not
be annulled on the due process challenge. 24 To reinforce its
conclusion on the issue of due process, the court noted that the
state legislature also did not require a penalty if the tax collector
failed to provide notice during the redemption period.25
B. JudicialImposition of Penaltyfor Statutory Violation
In the analysis of the statutory requirement for notice during
the redemption period, the Louisiana Supreme Court began with
the standard rules of statutory interpretation, acknowledging that
the starting point of interpretation is the statute itself. The statute
must be applied as written when the language is clear and
unambiguous and does not lead to an absurd result. 26 In analyzing
the construction of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:2180, the
court recognized that the term "shall" generally denotes a
mandatory duty.27 However, the statute did not explicitly provide
a penalty if the redemption notice was not provided, and the court
insisted that it was in no position to impose a penalty when the
legislature did not provide one.28 Based on its interpretation of
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:2180, the Louisiana
Supreme Court concluded that the statutory construction did not
allow the court to nullify the sale despite the tax collector's failure
to provide Mr. Hamilton with the notice of redemption in the last
year of his redemption period.

his property right at the tax sale, claiming that "[alt the tax sale, Mr. Hamilton
became divested of his property in strict compliance with due process rights."

Id.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 33.
Id.

NOTES
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IV.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS FOR THE REDEMPTION PERIOD:
WHAT SHOULD BE REQUIRED?

A. HistoricalBackground to Due Process Considerations
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the
question of whether due process requires notice during the
redemption period after a tax sale. 29 The issue in Hamilton is res
nova in constitutional law. The two most relevant cases to discuss
the current status of due process requirements for tax sales 3are
1
30
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams and Jones v. Flowers.
In Mennonite, the Court was faced with the issue of whether
notice by publication provides a mortgagee sufficient notice of a
tax sale. 32 Indiana law required that the taxpayer receive notice by
certified mail of the tax sale and at the end of the two-year
redemption period. 3 However, state law did not provide for any
such actual notice to the mortgagee of the property, and the only
additional notice provided to interested parties was notice by
publication and posting.34 The taxpayer in Mennonite received
notice of the tax sale, but the mortgagee was not apprised of the
proceedings until after the redemption period had expired.35
The Court applied its holding in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust CO. 36 that notice by publication was not reasonably
calculated to provide actual notice of the pending proceeding and
was therefore insufficient to meet the requirements of due process
when other reasonable means, such as mailed notice or personal
service, were available.37 The Court determined personal service
or mailed notice was required to advise the mortgagee of the

29. See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983);
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006).
30. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).

31.

547 U.S. 220 (2006).

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 792.
Id. at 792-93.
Id. at 793.
Id. at 794.
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 795-98.
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interest as long as the
potential loss of its substantial property
38
mortgagee is reasonably identifiable.
The significance of Mennonite is the Court's recognition of
notice requirements of the tax sale for interested parties other than
the owner of the property. While the limits of "interested parties"
are not definitively articulated, the Court clearly demonstrates that,
at a minimum, a mortgagee is entitled to the same notice of the tax
sale as the property owner. The Court had the opportunity to
address the issue of notice requirements for the redemption period
in Mennonite, since Indiana law also provided notice requirements
for the property owner and not the mortgagee at the end of the
redemption period. 3 9 However, since the Court found that notice
for the tax sale was insufficient to satisfy due process, it declined
to reach the question of notice during the redemption period.
The most recent United States Supreme Court case to address
due process requirements for tax sales is Jones v. Flowers.40 In
Jones, the owner of the property moved out of the home and failed
to pay property tax on it after the mortgage was paid in full in
1997.41 The Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands sent the
owner notice by certified mail of the tax delinquency and right to
redeem the property, but the notice was returned unclaimed. 4 The
commissioner sent a second notice to alert the owner that his
property would be sold in a tax sale if the delinquency was not
satisfied; this second notice was also returned unclaimed.43 The
issue in Jones was whether due process required the government to
take additional steps to notify the owner of the tax sale when the
notices sent to the owner were returned unclaimed. 44
The Court held that the government must take additional
reasonable steps to notify the owner of the pending tax sale process
if it is practicable to do so. 45 Mullane held that notice must be
employed in a manner that demonstrates a desire of providing
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.at 798-99.
Id. at 793-94.
547 U.S. 220 (2006).
Id. at 223-24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225.
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actual information to the absentee. Thus, when the certified mail
was returned unclaimed, further measures were clearly needed to
provide the owner with the actual information he needed to redeem
his property and avoid the tax sale.46
In Jones, the property owner raised the issue of due process
notice requirements for the redemption period with the Arkansas
Supreme Court.47 The court refused to address the merits of the
claim, however, because the issue was not properly raised in the
trial court.48 The issue of notice for redemption period was thus
not considered by the United States Supreme Court.
Although the two most recent United States Supreme Court
cases to address due process requirements for tax sales contained
issues with notice requirements for the redemption period, the
Court has never directly addressed the issue of whether due
process requires notice during the redemption period. This issue,
as presented in Hamilton, is ripe for final determination.
In order to fully evaluate the Louisiana Supreme Court's
determination that due process does not require notice during the
redemption period, the criteria for making a due process
determination must be identified and thoroughly examined as
applied to Mr. Hamilton directly. To establish a claim for
procedural due process, one must demonstrate an individualized
injury and a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 49 Once those
two criteria are met, an evaluation of5 several factors must be
applied to determine what process is due. 0
B. IndividualizedHarm, PropertyInterest
Mr. Hamilton clearly met the individualized injury criterion
since his property was sold in the tax sale. The Louisiana Supreme
46. Id. at 226.
47. Jones v. Flowers, 198 S.W.3d 520, 522-23 (Ark. 2004).
48. Id. at 523.
49. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
50. The additional factors for determining what process is due were defined
in Mathews. Id. at 335. The factors as addressed infra Part III.C consist of:
1. private interest;
2. risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and
3. governmental interest.
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Court suggested, however, that the second criterion of deprivation
of a protected interest was not satisfied, because Mr. Hamilton was
divested of his property interest at the tax sale. 5 1 The court thus
implied that Mr. Hamilton no longer had a protected property
interest during the redemption period.52
As recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Board of
Regents v. Roth, a property interest must be more than a unilateral
expectation and there must be some legitimate basis for the interest
to be protected by the Due Process Clause. 53 While constitutional
analysis provides the determination of what procedural
entitlements accompany a protected interest, existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source, such as state
law, establish the protected property interests themselves.54
As provided in article VII, section 25 of the Louisiana
Constitution, the right of redemption after the tax sale provides a
legitimate source of expectation for the taxpayer that the property
can still be recovered in full forpayment of delinquent taxes with
additional costs and penalties. 55 The right of redemption also
places the tax sale purchaser on notice that the taxpayer still has an
opportunity to redeem the property. The right of redemption
granted in the Louisiana Constitution demonstrates that the
purchaser's property interest during the three-year redemption
period is far from absolute. Although the property interest is more
limited after the tax sale and full redemption is conditioned on
paying taxes and fines, the property right is sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of due process.
Policy considerations further emphasize the need for the
redemption period to be recognized as a protected property
interest. Redemption statutes were created to (1) give taxpayers a
final chance to recover their property, and (2) take into
51. Hamilton v. Royal Int'l Petroleum Corp., 934 So. 2d 25, 32 (La. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 937 (2007).
52. Id.
53. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
54. Id.; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985).
See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976).
55. In Mr. Hamilton's case, the constitutional provision was sufficient to
create an expectation that Mr. Hamilton could recover his home with more than
$100,000 in equity for $71.68.
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consideration the hardships those individuals may face in
collecting the required funds for taxes and penalties in a short
period of time. 56 As applied in Louisiana, a taxpayer receives a
notice of delinquency twenty days before the property is sold at 57a
tax sale, but the redemption period allows three additional years.
This three-year period allows the taxpayer to accumulate the
necessary funds to redeem the property if that was not possible in
the twenty days before the tax sale.
In Harris v. Fuller, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized
that the intent of the redemption period granted in article VII,
section 25 of the Louisiana Constitution was to grant a tax debtor
an "unfettered right to reclaim his property within three years from
recordation of the tax sale." 58 Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court has long favored a liberal construction of
redemption laws in favor of the taxpayer, thus rejecting the notion
that interests of justice require strict construction of the right of
redemption. 59 Jurisprudential recognition of the importance of the
right of redemption to the taxpayer further demonstrates the need
to recognize the legislatively
created right of redemption as a
60
interest.
property
protected
The first two requirements of due process-individualized
harm and protected property interest-are satisfied by the facts of
Hamilton. The three-factor test from Mathews v. Eldridge must be
employed to determine whether additional procedural entitlements,
such as notice of the redemption period, are required by due
process.
C. ProceduralEntitlements
Due process notice requirements for any proceeding demand
that notice be reasonably capable of providing the necessary
information to the individual with a protected property interest. As
noted by the United States Supreme Court, "An elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which
56. Balthazar v. Mari Ltd., 301 F. Supp. 103, 106 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
57. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:2180A (2006).

58. 532 So. 2d 1367, 1370 (La. 1988).
59. Dubois v. Hepburn, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 1,22-23 (1836).
60. Harris,532 So. 2d at 1370-71.
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is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency
of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their
61
objections.",
Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard
appropriate to the nature of the case, 62 but the reasonableness of
the procedural requirements is also a factor in the evaluation.
Requirements that are impracticable or impossible are not justified
for the purposes of due process. 63 The ultimate question for the
Louisiana Supreme Court was whether Mr. Hamilton, through the
initial notice of the tax sale, had already been afforded sufficient
notice for due process requirements.
One scholar has noted that the wide range of practices in tax
sale procedures throughout the United States creates difficulty in
determining which points throughout the vastly different types of
proceedings require notice under due process. 64 While state law
often creates the property interest that due process protects, it is
constitutional law, not statutory provisions, that determines the
procedural entitlements that due process affords. 65 Constitutional
law has yet to make that final determination.
The final step in the analysis is evaluated under the three-factor
test established by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews v.
Eldridge.66 The Court recognized that the determination of
procedural entitlements could not be satisfied by a strict formula to
be universally applied. Instead, it would require a flexible analysis
67
to address the particular procedural needs of a given situation.
61. Mullane v. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
62. Id.
63. Id. at313-14.
64. Frank Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 IND. L.J.
747, 749-50 (2000). Alexander discussed the uncertainty of which events or
stages in a property tax enforcement proceeding give rise to the requirement of
adequate notice as one of four unanswered questions of due process
requirements for tax sales. Id. As stated in the article, "The question arises
whether notice must be given at each step in the proceedings, only in the initial
step, or perhaps at the final step in the enforcement proceeding." Id at 750.
65. See Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 260 (1907); Grannis v. Ordean,
234 U.S. 385 (1914).

66. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
67.

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972).
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To achieve this goal of adaptable analysis, the Mathews test
requires evaluation of the following criteria:
First,the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of the additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.68
1. PrivateInterest
The first step of the Mathews test is to determine the private
interest to be affected.69 Mr. Hamilton's private interest in the
redemption period appears somewhat reduced from his prior status
as full owner of the property. However, after the redemption
period expired, the obstacles to re-establishing full ownership of
his property became more significant. Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 47:2228 provides that the taxpayer must institute a suit to
annul the tax sale within six months of the purchaser's service of
petition and citation to quiet the tax title. 70 Thus, the redemption
68. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:2228 provides:
After the lapse of three years from the date of recording the tax deed in
the conveyance records of the parish where such property is situated,
the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, may institute suit by petition and
citation as in ordinary actions against the former proprietor or
proprietors of the property, in which petition must appear a description
of the property, mention of the time and place of the sale and name of
officer who made same, reference to page of record book and date of
recording tax deed, notice that petitioner is owner of the said property
by virtue of said tax sale, and notice that the title will be confirmed
unless a proceeding to annul is instituted within six months from date
of service of the petition and citation. This suit shall be brought in the
parish where the property is situated unless it lies in two or more
parishes, in which case this suit may be instituted in either of such
parishes. The petition and citation shall be served as in ordinary suits;
provided, that if the former proprietor be a nonresident of the state, or
unknown, or his residence be unknown, the court shall appoint a

276

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68

period serves as the last opportunity for the taxpayer to retrieve the
property by simply paying the taxes and penalties. Considering the
heightened obstacles to recover the property after the redemption
period and the potential for loss of valuable property for a much
less significant sum in delinquent taxes, Mr. Hamilton's private
interest in his statutorily protected property right of redemption is
obviously significant.
2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The second factor in the Mathews test is an evaluation of the
risk of erroneous deprivation under current procedural entitlements
and the potential value of the proposed additional procedural
safeguards. 7' After Mennonite, both the mortgage company and
the tax debtor are entitled to notice of the tax delinquency. 72 If
procedural requirements for notice are limited to notice prior to the
tax sale, the risk of erroneous deprivation develops if the tax debtor
and mortgage company fail to satisfy the delinquency prior to the
tax sale and are unaware of the opportunity to redeem the property
as granted by article VII, section 25 of the Louisiana Constitution.
Those who have a protected property interest are aware of the
threat of the tax sale and the imminence of the property deprivation
unless the delinquency is satisfied. However, the three-year
redemption period provides a crucial opportunity for the taxpayer
to fully recover the property despite the fact that it has already
been sold in a tax sale. If this vital information is not provided to
the taxpayer, there is a significant risk of erroneous deprivation of
property.
The probable value of additional procedural safeguards (in this
case, the notice of the redemption period) is also somewhat

curator ad hoc to represent him and receive service, and said curator
shall receive for his services a reasonable fee to be fixed by the court in
each suit, the same to be taxed as costs of suit. After the lapse of six
months from the date of service of petition and citation, if no
proceeding to annul the sale has been instituted, judgment shall be
rendered quieting and confirming the title.
71. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
72. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
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tempered by the initial notice of the delinquency. Since the parties
have received initial notice of the delinquency and are thereby
aware that the deprivation will take place if the delinquency is not
discharged, the additional notice during the redemption period
would serve two purposes: (1) to remind the interested parties that
the debt has not been satisfied, and (2) to inform them that the
redemption period provides an additional opportunity to fully
recover the property.
The first purpose of a reminder that the debt has not been paid
does not appeal to due process concerns, but the second purpose of
notification of the redemption period would address due process
interests in that it gives the interested parties awareness of an
additional opportunity to recover the property. Furthermore, the
additional notice would serve due process concerns by providing
more accurate information on the current status of the property
deprivation. Notice of the tax sale merely provides that the
property will be sold if the tax deficiency is not satisfied. Notice
of the redemption period would serve to notify the taxpayer that
the property has already been sold but can still be redeemed if the
taxes and additional fees are paid. Therefore, the second notice
alerts the taxpayer that a limited property deprivation has already
taken place through the tax sale, and deprivation of the property
will intensify if the taxpayer does not take the necessary action to
redeem the property.
Due process has long required notice of the delinquency prior
to the tax sale.73 It has also been recognized that, in the tax sale,
"notice which does not afford a realistic opportunity to produce
funds necessary to avoid forfeiture of the title or sell encumbered
property does not afford due process. ' , 74 Of note, Montana has
already addressed the issue of due process notice requirements in
relation to the redemption period, and its determination
can assist
75
in the evaluation of this factor of the Mathews test.
The Montana Supreme Court addressed the issue of due
process notice requirements in Tax Lien Services v. Hall.7 6 The
73. Id.; Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006).
74. McCann v. Scaduto, 71 N.Y.2d 164, 177 (N.Y. 1987).
75. Id.; Tax Lien Servs. v. Hall, 919 P.2d 396 (Mont. 1996).
76. 919 P.2d 396 (Mont. 1996).
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court recognized the right of redemption as a vested property right
and determined that notice by publication of the thirty day right of
redemption violated the notice requirements of the Due Process
Clause. 77 The court held that actual notice of the redemption
period was required when the taxpayers' names and addresses
were reasonably ascertainable. 8
Tax Lien Services provides an example of how the Louisiana
Supreme Court could have supported a determination that due
process requires notice of the redemption period, despite the lack
of concrete determination on the issue from the United States
Supreme Court. The risk of erroneous deprivation and the
probable value of additional procedural safeguards are influenced
by the additional procedures already in place for the tax sale
process.
The United States Supreme Court has already determined that
notice of the tax sale is required by the Due Process Clause, and
with such notice already provided, the argument for an additional
notice requirement for the redemption period appears somewhat
undermined. However, when viewed from the perspective that
notice of the redemption period alerts the taxpayer that a qualified
deprivation has already taken place and a more serious deprivation
is imminent unless the taxpayer satisfies the delinquency, the
second factor in Mathews garners more support in favor of the
additional notice requirement. When the issue of due process
requirements for the redemption period is finally addressed by the
United States Supreme Court, it is certainly the Court's
determination on this second factor in the Mathews evaluation that
will be most influential in determining the final outcome. The
grave risk of erroneous deprivation of property, combined with the
utility of notice of the redemption period to apprise property
owners of their ability to resume full ownership of their property,
demonstrate that the Court should conclude this second step in the
Mathews test favors required notice of the redemption period.

77. Id. at 399.
78. Id.
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3. Government Interest
The final step in the Mathews evaluation is determining the
government interest, including the additional fiscal and
administrative burdens in the proposed additional procedural
safeguards. 79 The government's fiscal burden of providing notice
during the redemption period is minimal. Notice is already
required prior to the tax sale to inform the taxpayer of the
delinquency, and constitutional law requires taking additional
reasonable steps to overcome initial difficulties in locating the
taxpayer by mail. 80 Any additional resources initially required to
locate the taxpayer have likely already been expended by the time
the redemption period comes into effect. The additional fiscal
burden of mailing notice to the taxpayer during the redemption
period also appears to be relatively minimal, especially in light of
the potential loss of property that mailing the notice could prevent.
Notice during the redemption period would increase the
administrative burden on the state by requiring the tax collector to
send the additional notice, but the burden is slight since the
information necessary to send the notice has already been obtained
prior to the tax sale. Although additional procedural requirements,
such as notice during the redemption period, will likely impose
some level of increased inconvenience on those who are required
to implement the procedures, due process is more than an
when the deprivation of
evaluation of government convenience
81
stake.
at
is
entitlements
important
Public policy also dictates that the government has an interest
in providing notice during the redemption period. The state has no
proper interest in depriving a legitimate owner of property without
notice and an opportunity to be heard;8 2 the state has no apparent
interest in protecting the tax sale purchaser's claim to the property
over the taxpayer's. Policy interests, combined with the minimal
financial and administrative burdens of providing additional notice,

79. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
80. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006).
81. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
82. Dow v. State, 240 N.W.2d 450, 459 (Mich. 1976).

[Vol. 68

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

tend to support providing additional notice during the redemption
period.
In applying the Mathews test, it appears that the court's
conclusion on due process requirements for the redemption period
was erroneous. The court rejected the due process claim on the
grounds that there was no legitimate property entitlement in the
redemption period. 3 At the very least, the court terminated the
the
due process evaluation prematurely by not 8recognizing
4
redemption period as a protected property interest.
83. Hamilton v. Royal Int'l Petroleum Corp., 934 So. 2d 25, 30 (La. 2006),
cert denied, 127 S. Ct. 937 (2007).
84. The Due Process Clause can also serve as a protection of procedural
entitlements separate from a fundamental fairness evaluation under Mathews v.
Eldridge, and the Louisiana Supreme Court could have taken this approach to
interpret the statute as requiring notice for redemption. Due process in the
context of a rule of law evaluation requires that government entities adhere to
the rights granted by statutes. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T.
MAYTON,
REGULATING
ACCORDING
TO
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 71-73 (2d ed. 2001).

RULES:

DUE

PROCESS

IN

Essentially, the Court has been
willing to read statutes that establish procedural rights as protected liberty or
property interests. Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State,
72 CAL. L. REv. 1044, 1078 (1984). Such a reading creates a legitimate claim of
entitlement, and government entities are required to apply the statutorily granted
procedure uniformly. Id. The rationale behind such a requirement is to protect
individuals from potential oppression from state agents when the state acts
directly on the individuals. Id. at 1104, 1106-07. Under the rule of law aspect
of due process, it is recognized that state-granted procedural rights need to be
protected, just as state substantive rights are protected under the fundamental
fairness evaluation. Id. at 1133-34.
Under this rule of law aspect of due process, the Louisiana Supreme Court
clearly could have recognized that the notice requirement for the redemption
period was required by due process. As noted by one scholar, a reading of
statutory procedural rights that allows unauthorized discretion by state agents is
the very essence of unfairness and allows the potential for indiscriminate
oppression. Id. at 1134. However, the court chose to interpret the statute as not
requiring notice despite the mandatory language of the statute, and any further
challenges in the United States Supreme Court will be bound by the Louisiana
Supreme Court's interpretation of the state statute.
A potential avenue that could have been utilized to support the outcome in
Hamilton is provided in Louisiana Civil Code article 5, which provides that no
person can avail himself of ignorance of the law. While Mr. Hamilton was
apparently unaware of his right of redemption, the appellant's argument did not
rely on ignorance as a defense. Rather, Mr. Hamilton contends that he was not
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V. INTERPRETATION OF NOTICE FOR REDEMPTION AS STATE LAW
ENTITLEMENT

The Louisiana Supreme Court erred in its due process analysis
in Hamilton, and the court's resolution that civil law tradition
prohibited the judiciary from imposing a penalty where the statute
failed to expressly provide one is further evidence of the injustice
committed by the court in Hamilton. This section discusses the
historical context of the court's references to civil law traditions
followed by a critique of the traditional view. This section then
examines the Louisiana Supreme Court's analysis on the issue of
statutory interpretation. The section concludes with a review of
equity as a tool employed by the judiciary and demonstrates
alternative resolutions that the court could have reached without
violating the role of the judiciary in Louisiana.
A. HistoricalAnalysis

The Louisiana Supreme Court determined that civil law
tradition dictated that the judicial system could not impose a
penalty where the legislature had chosen not to provide one. The
court therefore refused to nullify the tax sale, because Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 47:2180 does not supply
85 a penalty for
failure to provide notice of the redemption period. To understand
the reasoning behind the Louisiana Supreme Court's statutory
interpretation of the notice requirement for the redemption period,
a brief history of the weight of various sources of law in the civil
law tradition is necessary.
Stemming from early influences of Roman law, the civil law
86
recognizes legislation and custom as the primary sources of law.

afforded the required notice of redemption. Since this issue was not addressed
by the supreme court, it is treated here merely to discuss the potential merits of
such a position.
85. Hamilton v. Royal Int'l Petroleum Corp., 934 So. 2d 25, 33 (La. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 937 (2007).
86. KENNETH M. MURCHISON & J.-R. TRAHAN, WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITIONS AND SYSTEMS: LOUISIANA IMPACT 85 (rev. ed. Fall 2003) (citing G.
INST. 1.1 (S.P. Scott trans.); J. INST. 1.2.3, 9 (S.P. Scott trans.)).
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Jurisprudence, however, has traditionally been identified as a
secondary source of law.87 As noted by Carbonnier, jurisprudence
in the civil law has not been viewed as a primary source because
judicial decisions are not binding outside of the parties to the
litigation.88 Jurisprudence has also traditionally not been viewed
as binding under the theory of customary law because single
decisions do not have the characteristics of popular support or
significant duration in time required for custom.8 9 The Louisiana
Civil Code reflects this traditional approach by explicitly naming
of law and denoting
legislation and custom as primary 9 sources
0
jurisprudence as a secondary source.
B. Critiqueof the TraditionalView: The Power of Interpretation
While jurisprudence is recognized as a secondary source of law
in the civil law, the power of judges to interpret law, and
particularly to fill gaps in the law where legislation does not
provide concrete answers, forces the judicial system to expand out
of necessity beyond the mere application of written law to factual
situations. As noted in a scholarly evaluation of the role of the
judicial system in the civil law, "[T]he judge can find himself in the
presence of fact that has totally escaped the legislator, for example a
'new' fact that springs from the transformation of life ...."91 The
Louisiana Civil Code provides a solution when such gaps arise in
written law by stating that where no answer can be found in
legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to
92
equity; employing justice, reason, and prevailing usages.
Legislation is still a primary source of law and jurisprudence
remains a secondary source, but practice dictates that there are
times when judges have to look beyond the text of legislation to
resolve the factual issues that life experiences create.
87. Id.at 100 (citing JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION 25658, n. 144 (20th ed. 1991)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 101.
90. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1, cmt. b (2007).
91. MURCHISON & TRAHAN, supra note 86, at 105 (citing ALEX WEILL &
FRANCOIS TERRE, DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION GENERALE 205 (4th ed. 1979)).
92. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4 (2007).

2007]

NOTES

1. FirstStep in Interpretation.Is the Text Clear?
With the understanding that judges at times will have to look
beyond the text of the statute to resolve questions that arise in
litigation, the first question in statutory interpretation is whether
the text of the statute is clear and unambiguous. The traditional
maxim interpretatio cessat in claris dictates that there is no need
for further interpretation if the text is clear. 93 However, scholarly
opinion challenges this maxim, recognizing that the common
observation that interpretation is not necessary when the wording
is clear ignores the process of interpretation that has already taken
place. 94 Natural language in text is susceptible to multiple
meanings depending on the grammatical context in which words
are used and the factual situation to which the words are being
applied, so to say that the text of a statute is clear and unambiguous
generally demonstrates that some level of interpretation has
already taken
place in order to adopt one meaning of the text in
95
question.

2. Second Step: Beyond the Boundaries of Text
If it is accepted, however, that the text of a statute is unclear, as
previously acknowledged, the judge must go beyond the text to
resolve the issue. Gaps in legislation can result purely from the
uncertainty of human experience and the impossibility of
legislation to cover every possible human circumstance, 9 6 or from

structural deficiencies within the legislation. A complete rule of
law generally consists of two parts: the thing that ought to be done,
and the sanction that ought to be imposed if the party responsible
for carrying out the duty does not perform as required by law. 97 It
is not infrequent, however, for rules of law to be incomplete, 98 with
93. MURCHISON & TRAHAN, supra note 86, at 168.
94. JULIO CUETO-RUA, JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE
LAW 96 (1981). See MARCEL PLANIOL, 1 TRAIt ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL
158 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1939) (discussing that even if the text of
legislation is clear, it may require interpretation).
95. PLANIOL, supra note 94.
96. Id. at 99.
97. Id. at 106.
98. Id.
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the provisions of the rights and penalties either not co-existing in
the same piece of legislation or not co-existing at all. Such
circumstances generally dictate that further interpretation is
necessary.
If a gap in legislation becomes apparent, or a literal application
of the legislation will lead to an unjust result, the judge can look to
see if other meanings can be identified that are more consistent
with the issue at hand.99 One of the tools that the judge can
employ is a search for the legislature's purpose in enacting the
particular rule of law. The legislature employs law-making power
to achieve a social end, in which human institutions, human
interests, and the well-being of people are protected. General rules
of law should be considered as tools by the legislature to achieve a
purpose which the legislature has deemed as good, rather than
interpreting legislation as a purely logical instrument.' 00 As noted
by Planiol, "Laws . ..are made in order to obtain for man the
greatest possible amount of good. A juridical science which would
lead to unjust or dangerous solutions would be false. It would
defeat its own purpose."''
The judge should not rely on logic alone, but should temper
10 2
logical considerations with the notions of utility and equity.
While a judge cannot substitute his own personal thought for that
of the legislature, there must be a balance in interpretation of law
that moderates logic to avoid purely mechanical interpretation,
especially when such a result would lead to application of
legislation in a way that defeats the purpose for which the law was
created. 103
A number of current and former influential judges in Louisiana
have published extensive commentaries on judicial interpretation
to support the notion that a judge must often look beyond the plain
99. Id. As noted by Chief Justice Dixon, "[The statute] cannot be given an
absurd interpretation. It must be interpreted in a way that will be understood by
most people and that will be accepted by most people." John A. Dixon, Jr., The
Judicial Method in Interpretation of Law in Louisiana, 42 LA. L. REv. 1661,
1669 (1982).
100.

PLANIOL, supra note 94, at 176-77.

101. Id.at 162.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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text of the legislation to provide just resolutions to the cases they
decide. As noted by Judge Albert Tate, "The rapidly changing
social environment and innovative legislative responses to it have
often necessitated new judicial perceptions and reevaluations of
of the changed and
prior precepts and applications in light
' ' 04
context.
legislative
and
social
changing
In the end, the judge has the capacity to weigh the
consequences of judicial action before reaching a final conclusion.
The notion that the judge is an obedient servant of written words
and that a particular consequence is utterly unavoidable in the
application of law to a case is a notion that is generally
unrealistic. 105
C. A Second Glance at the Court'sAnalysis
After a review of the civil law tradition in Louisiana and
methodology utilized to interpret statutes, a review of the court's
decision is necessary to determine whether its conclusion that no
penalty could be imposed was imperative.
1. Interpretationof the Statutory Language
As noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hamilton, the
starting point for the interpretation of legislation is the language of
the statute itself.10 6 The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that
104.

Albert Tate, Jr., The "New" JudicialSolution: Occasionsfor and Limits

to Judicial Creativity, 54 TuL. L. REv. 877, 877 (1980). See James L. Dennis,
Interpretationand Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial

Precedent,54 LA. L. REv. 1, 8 (1993):
I believe that.., if judges were confined to a function of subsuming
facts under concepts deduced or construed from abstract legal rules, the
jurisprudence would be less in touch with reality and more legalistic
because judges and lawyers are more apt to disagree and split hairs
about abstract concepts than the real human interests in conflict in
particular situations.
Justice Dennis was specifically addressing the interpretation of the Louisiana
Civil Code and the need to look outside of the Code to fill gaps in legislation,
but the same principle applies to interpretation of statutes. Id.
105. CUETO-RUA, supra note 94, at 187.
106. Hamilton v. Royal Int'l Petroleum Corp., 934 So. 2d 25, 32-33 (La.
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 937 (2007); SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v.
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the language in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:2180 was
07
clear, unambiguous, and did not lead to absurd consequences.1
Therefore, the statute had to be applied as written, which meant
that a provision requiring notice of the redemption period could be
violated by the tax collector without repercussion because the
language of the statute itself did not provide for a penalty.' 1 8 Is it
fair to say that the language is clear and unambiguous when the
legislature has specifically chosen the word "shall," which the
court recognized as indicating a mandatory provision,109 but no
penalty is provided in the statute for the tax collector's failure to
provide such notice?
The contradictory indications of the word "shall" and the lack
of an express penalty suggest that a deeper investigation into the
meaning of the words is necessary to find the legislature's purpose
for amending the statute. The Louisiana Supreme Court has noted
previously that when a law is susceptible to different meanings, it
must be interpTreted in a manner that best conforms to the purpose
of the law."
Furthermore, the meaning and intent of the statute
should be determined in light of other laws concerning the same
subject matter, and the new provision should be construed in a
manner that is consistent with the terms of the statute and the
obvious intent of the lawmaker enacting it. 1 '
Judicial
presumptions of interpretation of legislation include the
presumption that those who enacted the statutory provisions acted
deliberately with full knowledge of related laws and were aware of
court cases on the subject matter and principles of statutory
construction. 1 2

Bond, 808 So. 2d 294, 302 (La. 2001); Cat's Meow, Inc. v. City of New
Orleans, 617 So. 2d 1186, 1198 (La. 1998).
107. Hamilton, 934 So. 2d at 32-33.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 33.
110. Richard v. Hall, 874 So. 2d 131, 149 (La. 2004) (citing LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 10).
111. Id. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 13 (2007).
112. P. RAYMOND LAMONICA & JERRY G. JONES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 7.3, in 20 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 136 (2004).
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Prior to Act 984 of the 1997 legislative session, Louisiana
recognized a right of redemption in article VII, section 25 of the
Louisiana Constitution, but no notice was required during the
redemption period. With the 1997 amendment to Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 47:2180A, the legislature created an
additional requirement of notice each year during the three-year
redemption period, thus providing additional notice requirements
to the tax sale process which had previously
only required notice
3
of the delinquency and pending tax sale."
Although no penalty is explicitly provided if the tax collector
fails to meet either of the notice requirements, multiple sources of
authority have previously recognized that tax delinquency
proceedings against private property require strict adherence to
statutory requirements. If those requirements are not met, the
proceeding is null. In 1832, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Spiller's Heirs v. Baumhardrecognized that failure to comply with
the formalities of a tax sale imposed by law require that the
proceeding be declared null. 114 As stated by the court, "[Well
settled legal principles] require the purchasers [at tax sales], in
order to give validity to the titles such acquired, to show strict
fulfillment of all formalities imposed by law."' 1' 5 Because many of
the formalities required for tax sales were
not met in Spiller's
16
Heirs, the court declared the tax sale null."
Under similar circumstances, the Louisiana Attorney General
recognized that tax adjudications also require strict adherence to
statutory procedural provisions for the process as a whole to be
valid. 117 In the particular situation addressed in the Attorney
General Opinion, there was doubt as to whether all interested
parties had received notice of the tax sale, but it was clear that the
tax debtor and mortgagee had not received the post tax sale notice
of adjudication as required by Louisiana Revised Statutes section
47:2186.118 The Attorney General recognized that post tax sale

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:2180A (1990).
4La. 206(La. 1832).
Id.
Id.
1-1010 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 91-663 (1992).
Id.
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notice was statutorily mandated,1 9 and failure to comply with the
statutory requirement of notice meant that the tax sale and
adjudication were null.120 Although portions of the opinion rely on
United FinancialGroup, Inc. v. Davis,12 1 which was abrogated by
the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hamilton, the discussion of the
statutory procedural requirements provides further evidence to
support the 22nullity of tax sales that fail to meet such
1
requirements.
In addition to looking at related legislation and other sources of
authority to determine the intended purpose of the redemption
notice requirement, one must also look to the language of the
statute itself to determine its meaning and intended effect. As
noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, courts should give effect to
all portions of a statute and should not apply a statutory
construction that makes any part of the legislation meaningless or
superfluous. 123 In Hamilton, the court recognized that the use of
the word "shall" generally denotes a mandatory duty but followed
that acknowledgement by saying that mandatory statutes have to
119. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:2186 also states that the tax
collector "shall" notify the tax debtor after the adjudication.
120. Op. Att'yGen., supra note 117.
121. 481 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
122. The fatal flaw in United which led the Louisiana Supreme Court to
abrogate the decision was tying the post tax sale notice requirements to
procedural due process. If the First Circuit Court of Appeal had limited the
discussion to state law interpretation and not tied its holding to the Due Process
Clause, the notice requirements could still have been interpreted as mandatory,
but strictly as an interpretation of state law and not constitutional law. Since the
United States Supreme Court has never held that post tax sale notice is required
by the Due Process Clause, the Louisiana Supreme Court had justifiable grounds
to abrogate the first circuit's decision in United. The portions of the Attorney
General Opinion that discuss United and tie the post tax sale adjudication notice
to due process suffers from the same fault, but the discussion of statutory
construction alone is sufficient to provide a basis for recognizing the notice
requirements as mandatory and requiring nullification of the sale if the notice
requirements are not met.
123. SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 294, 302 (La.
2001); Langlois v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 761 So. 2d 504, 507 (La.
2000). See also LAMONICA & JONES, supra note 112 (discussing the judicial
presumption that every word in a provision of law is intended to serve a useful
purpose and should not be given an interpretation that makes the word
unnecessary or superfluous).
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1 24
prescribe the result that will follow if the duty is not performed.
When the court recognizes that the word "shall" denotes a
mandatory duty, and then says the statute as a whole cannot be
mandatory without the additional requirement of a penalty
provided in the statute, does that not give the legislature's express
choice of the word "shall" a superfluous interpretation?
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 1:3, titled "Words and
phrases, how construed," explicitly states that the word "shall" is
mandatory. The use of the terms "shall" and "may" assist in
determining whether a statute is classified as directory or
mandatory, and the classification of mandatory as opposed to
directory rests in a determination of the legislative intent of the
statute. 25 If the requirement of the statute is so essential to the
statutory scheme that the legislative intent would be frustrated by
non-compliance, then the statute is classified as mandatory even if
the statute does not specify a penalty that will follow from noncompliance with the duty.' 26 Furthermore, a significant factor in
determining the statute's classification lies in comparing127the results
to which each of the possible constructions would lead.
The legislature's intent in requiring notice for the redemption
period, and particularly in its choice of the word "shall" to denote a
mandatory duty, strongly suggests that the additional notice was an
obligatory procedure to the tax sale process. If the legislature
intended for the redemption notice to be obligatory, and the tax
collector failed to provide such notice, the interpretation of the
Louisiana Supreme Court frustrates the intent of the legislature by
providing no remedy to the taxpayer for the tax collector's failure
to execute a mandatory duty. However, if the tax collector fails to
provide the required notice for the redemption period and the word
"shall" is interpreted as requiring the tax sale be declared null, the
legislative intent for the redemption notice requirement is satisfied.

124. Hamilton v. Royal Int'l Petroleum Corp., 934 So. 2d 25, 33 (La. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 937 (2007).
125. Sanchez v. Ga. Gulf Corp., 853 So. 2d 697, 705 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2003).
126. Id.
127. Christopher v. New Orleans Fire Dept., 757 So. 2d 863, 866 (La. App.
4th Cir. 2000).
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2. Refusal to Impose Penalty
To support its determination that the judicial system could not
impose a penalty for the tax collector's failure to provide notice of
redemption, the Louisiana Supreme Court cited White v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. for the principle that courts cannot rewrite laws to
effect a purpose not otherwise expressed.128 The proposition of the
court's inability to rewrite the statute was addressed in White, but
the context in which it was raised was to enforce the mandatory
requirements of the statute in spite of a lack of express penalty
in
29
the statute for failure to meet the mandatory requirements. 1
For a slip and fall case, Louisiana Revised Statutes section
9:2800.6 states that the claimant "shall" have the burden of
proving that the merchant created or had actual knowledge or
constructive knowledge of the condition which caused the damage.
The appellate court in White allowed the burden of proof of actual
or constructive knowledge to shift to the defendant, forcing the0
store to positively demonstrate that they had no such knowledge.13
The Louisiana Supreme Court determined that "shall" denoted a
mandatory requirement for the claimant to prove the knowledge as
a required factor to enable recovery.' 3 1 Within this context, the
court acknowledged that the judiciary could not rewrite the
legislation to allow a shift in the burden of proof. Noting the
mandatory burden of proof requirements for the claimant and the
failure to satisfy the proof of actual or constructive knowledge, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the failure was fatal to the
claimant's cause of action. 132 Although Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 9:2800.6 does not expressly provide that failure to
satisfy one of the elements fails to prove the cause of action and
128. Hamilton v. Royal Int'l Petroleum Corp., 934 So. 2d at 33 (La. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 937 (2007). The court cited both Cacamo v. Liberty
Mut. Fire Ins. Col, 764 So. 2d 41, 44 (La. 2000) and White v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 699 So. 2d 1081, 1084 (La. 1997) as authority, but Cacamo also cited
White for the proposition that the statute could not be rewritten, so this comment
will focus on White as the primary source of the authority. Hamilton, 934 So. 2d
at 33.
129. White, 699 So. 2d 1081.
130. Id. at 1083.
131. Id.at 1084.
132. Id.at 1086.
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the ability of the claimant to recover, the statute implies through
the use of the word "shall" that failure to meet all of the
requirements results in a failure to prove a cause of action.
Similarly, in Hamilton, the statutory duty of notice is prefaced
with "shall," and the tax collector's failure to comply with the duty
should have required the nullification of the tax sale. Because of
the legislature's employment of the term "shall," the failure to
meet all of the mandatory procedural requirements for a tax sale
should similarly require nullification of the sale.
To further develop a foundation for the proposition that the
judicial system could not provide a penalty, the Louisiana Supreme
Court implied in Hamilton that statutes must prescribe the result
that will follow if a duty is not satisfied in order be classified as
mandatory. The court resorted to the civilian principle that the
judiciary cannot perform legislative duties by inserting penalty
provisions where the legislature has chosen not to do so. 1 3 The
two cases cited by the court to support these propositions refused
to give the statutory provisions mandatory effect on similar
grounds.
In Sanders v. Department of Health andHuman Resources, the
court refused to classify a section of the State Civil Service
Commission Rules as mandatory even though the rule stated that
the director "shall" be furnished with notice within fifteen days of
an employee being fired. 134 In Sanders, the refusal to give the rule
mandatory effect was apparently based on the purpose of the
statute as a whole rather than the absence of the penalty provision
in the statute.' 35 The purpose of the notice requirement in Sanders
was to guide governmental officials in the discharge of their
administrative
morelegislation
generally which
to secure
order.to136 guide
The
court expresslyduties
notedandthat
serves

133. Hamilton v. Royal Int'l Petroleum Corp., 934 So. 2d 25, 33 (La. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 937 (2007) (citing Sanders v. Dep't of Health and
Human Res., 388 So. 2d 768, 770 (La. 1980) for the proposition that mandatory
statutes provide the result that will follow if the thing is not done and Carter v.
Duhe, 921 So. 2d 963, 970 (La. 2006) for the civilian concept that the judicial
branch cannot impose a penalty where the legislature has chosen not to do so).
134. 388 So. 2d at 770.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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governmental action is usually construed as directory, even when
the legislation is worded in the imperative.' 37 The court mentioned
the express provision of a penalty as a distinction between
mandatory and directory statutes, but its reason for classifying the
civil service rule as directory was that the purpose of the statute
was to provide guidance for government officials and not to grant
rights to private citizens. The court emphasized this as the more
38
vital distinction than the lack of an express penalty provision.'
Sanders demonstrates that a penalty provision can provide
convincing evidence that the legislature intended for the statute to
have a mandatory effect, but nothing in the decision suggests that
the criterion is obligatory for such a classification. 3 More
importantly, Sanders emphasizes that regulations for government
order within government entities are more likely to carry a
directory classification, regardless of the wording of the statute.
Sanders also suggests that a statute that protects the private rights
of citizens and contains imperative wording is more likely to
receive a mandatory classification, because the rights of private
citizens require a higher level of protection than regulations for
government order.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's employment of Carter v.
Duhe 140 for the proposition that the judicial branch in a civilian
system cannot impose a penalty where the legislature has chosen
not to provide one has a sturdy historical foundation. However,
the emphasis for the principle in Carter should again be placed on
legislative intent as to whether it is clear that the legislature has
explicitly decided not to impose a penalty. In Carter, the court
determined that the failure of the builder to provide notice of the
requirements of the New Home Warranty Act (NHWA) could not
result in the inapplicability of the NHWA to the owners' claims
against the builder. 14 1 The court refused to render the Act
inapplicable because the NHWA explicitly stated that it was the
exclusive remedy for homeowners and all other theories of
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 921 So. 2d 963 (La. 2006).
141. Id.
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recovery were excluded. 142 A construction of the statute that
would render it null if the notice requirement was not met would
allow one party to unilaterally waive the exclusive remedy
provision expressly provided by the legislature, and such143 a
statutory construction would defy the explicit legislative intent.
Both Sanders and Carter represent two exceptions in which
regulations that provide mandatory duties with the use of the word
"shall" are not generally interpreted as mandatory statutes. When
the purpose of the legislation is to provide internal administrative
direction and order for government entities, or when legislative
intent is clear that a statutory provision should not be construed as
mandatory, the legislation may be classified as directory despite
the employment of "shall" and the overall appearance that the
provision is mandatory. However, a statute that protects rights of
private individuals, with the express use of the word "shall,"
demonstrates more clearly an intent by the legislature that the
provisions be construed as mandatory. Finally, the court's reliance
on Louisiana's civilian tradition is peculiar since the Louisiana
Civil Code dictates that a judge can resort to equity when the
meaning of a statute is unclear or its application leads to an absurd
or unjust result.
D. Judicial Tool of Equity
When the legislature clearly intends the statute to be mandatory
and no penalty provision is expressly offered, a judge can resort to
equity to provide the penalty. 44 Justice Dennis noted the role of
equity in Louisiana by stating:
Because Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction, the absence of
express law does not imply a lack of authority for courts to
provide relief. In all civil matters, where positive law is

142. Id. at 969.
143. Id.
144. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4 (2007). Chief Justice Dixon referred to this
article on judicial employment of equity as "the most important of the statutory
rules for interpretation." John A. Dixon, Jr., JudicialMethod in Interpretation
of Law in Louisiana,27 LA. L. REv. 1661, 1666 (1982).
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silent, the judge is bound by the Civil Code to proceed and
decide according to equity .... 145
The classic civilian notion of equity requires judges to act as
legislators of last resort in the narrow circumstances where the law
is silent. 146 However, in practice, judges have exercised an
inherent power of equity which has been utilized not only in gapfilling, but also to cure perceived injustices in the mechanical
application of the legislation to human experience. 147 Judges have
resorted to equity in Louisiana to develop theories of recovery such
as detrimental reliance, bona fide purchaser, unjust enrichment,
and contra non valentem to fill gaps and cure injustices. These
judicially created equitable solutions have ripened into
jurisprudence constante despite the delayed or non-existent
response from the legislature.
1. Unjust Enrichment
As an example of judicial application of equity, the theory of
unjust enrichment was first developed in Louisiana through
judicial implementation of equity. Unjust enrichment was not
incorporated into the Louisiana Civil Code, and Minyard v. Curtis
Products was the first case to recognize unjust enrichment as a
theory of recovery. 149 In Minyard, a subcontractor utilized
defective caulking compound in a housing project. 150
The
defective materials required Minyard to indemnify the general
contractor for the additional costs incurred for corrective
maintenance that was later required. 151 Minyard filed suit against
the manufacturer, Curtis Products, for "indemnity" of the defective
product. 152 Curtis Products challenged that the applicable law was
145. Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304, 307 (La. 1978).
146. Vernon V. Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed Jurisdiction:
A FunctionalView of Equity in Louisiana,69 TUL. L. REv. 7, 10 (1994).
147. Id. at 11, 19-20.
148. Id. at 30.
149. Id. at 42-43 (citing Minyard v. Curtis Products, 205 So. 2d 422, 427
(La. 1967)).
150. Minyard, 205 So. 2d at 425.
151. Id. at 426.
152. Id.
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redhibition 53
and breach of contract, and those claims had already
prescribed. 1
The Louisiana Supreme Court used this opportunity to
introduce unjust enrichment as a quasi-contract claim to allow
Minyard to recover from the manufacturer.' 54 The court was
unclear about the nature of the gap in legislation that was being
filled by the creation of unjust enrichment, since it could have
easily concluded that no privity of contract existed and Minyard
could not recover. It appears here that the court perceived an
injustice in the mechanical application of the law of obligations to
Minyard's situation, and unjust enrichment developed as a means
to cure such an injustice despite the apparent lack of options
available in existing law. The Louisiana Civil Code was revised in
1995 to incorporate the theory of unjust enrichment into
legislation, which demonstrates an example of delayed legislative
response to codify longstanding trends in judicial employment of
equity. 155
2. Contra Non Valentem
As an additional example of judicial use of equity to fill gaps
and avoid injustice, Louisiana courts have employed the maxim
contra non valentem to adjust the generally rigid rules of
prescription for exceptional circumstances.1 56 The concept of

153. Id. The court recognized that Minyard's claims were directed at the
manufacturer and not the distributor. Irrespective of prescription, Minyard had no
privity of contract with the manufacturer. Id. at 427.
154. Id. at 431. The court recognized that the theory of indemnity in quasicontracts already existed in jurisprudence. It then analogized the theory of unjust
enrichment to Louisiana Civil Code article 1965 (1870) and determined that the
two examples of quasi-contracts articulated in article 2294 derived from a more
general principle of unjust enrichment. Id. at 427-32.
155. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2298 (2007) (defining enrichment without cause,
or unjust enrichment).
156. The exceptional circumstances that can trigger contra non valentem were
outlined in Corsey v. State Dept. of Corrections as:

1. where there was some legal cause which prevented the courts or
their officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the plaintiffs
action;
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contra non valentem has Roman law origins, and the commentator
Bartolus was the first to proclaim the57 full maxim contra non
valentem agere non curritpraescriptio.1
Although the Louisiana Legislature has never incorporated
contra non valentem into legislation, Louisiana courts have
adopted the maxim when they determine that individual
circumstances justify an exception to the prescriptive period
provided by law.' 58 Of note, the Louisiana Civil Code expressly
requires that the only exceptions to prescription are those provided
by law.' 59 Despite the express legislative intent, Louisiana courts
have employed contra non valentem, which has not been
sanctioned by legislation, since at least 1817 when the Louisiana
Supreme Court first employed the maxim by name.' 60 The history
of contra non valentem represents an extraordinary example of the
Louisiana judiciary's implementation of equity to rectify potential
injustices. The use of this maxim demonstrates that the judicial
system in Louisiana has the ability to employ equity not only to fill
gaps in legislation but to avoid blatant unfairness in its decisions,
even when legislation expressly provides for a result to the
contrary.

2. where there was some condition coupled with the contract or
connected with the proceedings that prevented the creditor from suing
or acting;
3. where the debtor himself has done some act effectually to prevent
the creditor from availing himself of his cause of action; or
4. where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable
by the plaintiff, even though his ignorance is not induced by the
defendant.
375 So. 2d 1319, 1321-22 (La. 1979).
157. Palmer, supra note 146, 64-65. The maxim means "prescription does not
run against one prevented from acting." Id.
158. Id. at 66. Louisiana Civil Code article 3467 (2007) states, "Prescription
runs against all persons unless exception is established by law."
159. Art. 3467. Comment (d) of article 3467 recognizes that courts use contra
non valentem in exceptional circumstances despite the language of the article, but

the comment serves as doctrine and not as legislative authority.
160. Palmer, supra note 146, 66-67 (citing Quierry's Ex'r v. Faussier's Ex'rs,
4 Mart. (o.s.) 609, 610-11 (La. 1817)).
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3. Equity as Applied to Hamilton
The examples of unjust enrichment and contra non valentem
demonstrate that the Louisiana judiciary has the ability to employ
equity to fill gaps and avoid injustice which can result from
mechanical application of legislation. With regard to Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 47:2180, it is apparent that the legislature
intended for the notice requirement to protect during the
redemption period in order to further protect the private property
owner's right to recover the property. Once this is acknowledged,
it is well within the power of the judicial system to resort to equity
to avoid the clear injustice that would result if the tax collector
fails to provide the required notice but no penalty is expressly
provided by legislation.
The two most apparent possibilities for an equitable solution in
Hamilton would be (1) to nullify the tax sale, or (2) to require that
the redemption period not begin to run until the required notice is
provided. The nullity of the tax sale can be grounded by analogy
in the nullity required for failure to provide notice prior to the tax
sale; the suspension of the redemption period would be similar to a
suspension of prescription. These are the two most obvious
solutions, but there are likely other alternatives available to rectify
the injustice committed in Hamilton. The emphasis here is not on
which solution would be best under judicial implementation of
equity; the point is that the Louisiana Supreme Court clearly had
other alternatives available but chose instead to hide behind the
rigid traditional concepts of civil law tradition.
The judiciary is entrusted with the responsibility of interpreting
and applying legislation to life experience presented by individual
cases. In Hamilton, the court's conclusion that it could not provide
a penalty despite the obvious injustice that resulted was a failure
by the judiciary to perform its primary function and responsibility
to the state of Louisiana. When the text is clear, traditional civilian
methodology requires interpretation to go no further. The text of
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:2180 was far from clear in
its application in Hamilton, and the court's utter dismissal of
available alternatives was a denial of justice.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Despite the Louisiana Supreme Court's apparent resignation to
its conclusion that the tax sale in Hamilton could not be nullified,
this case was not bound to such a result. Due process likely
requires notice during the redemption period, but if that avenue
fails, the desired result certainly could have been met under state
statutory interpretation without violating civil law tradition. The
judicial system should not render judgments that are defiant of
legislative intent, but when the legislature utilizes words that
denote a mandatory duty to protect private rights of individuals,
judges should employ equity to achieve a just result.
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